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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SUMMARY

BLUESTEIN v. SKINNER: FAA'S RANDOM
DRUG TESTING UPHELD IN "SAFETYSENSITIVE" JOBS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bluestein u. Skinner,l the Ninth Circuit upheld Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations requiring random
drug testing of several categories of employees in the private
commercial aviation industry.2 The court rejected petitioners'3
arguments that the regulations violate the fourth amendment'
and are arbitrary and capricious in violation of section lO(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act.1i
1. Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990) (per Norris, J.; the other panel
members were Canby, J., and Chambers, J. concurring), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3561
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1991) (No. 90-735).
2. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453.
3. Petitioners included commercial aviation industry employees who are subject to
the drug testing, the industry labor organizations and an organization of aviation employees and employers. Id. at 454.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons. . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause

5. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1990). The Administrative
Procedure Act 10(e) provides in pertinent part: "The reviewing court shall - (2) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be - (a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; ... "
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II.

BACKGROUND

A.

THE FAA REGULATIONS

On November

21, 1988

[Vol. 21:73

the FAA issued a rule 6 reqUIrIng

commercial air carriers and air traffic contr.ol facilities 8 to per7

form random drug testing on their employees. 9 Employees in
several categories must be tested. 10 Tests for marijuana, cocaine,
opiates,

phencyclidine

(PCP)

and

amphetamines

must

be

performed. 11
The regulations require employees to be randomly selected
for testing, using computer generated numbers or a random
number table that is matched with an employee's social security
number, payroll identification number, or any other FAA-approved method. 12 After the first year of testing, employers must
randomly test at least

50 percent of the employees annually in

the job categories listed above. 13
6. 53 Fed. Reg. 47024 (1988) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63, 65, 121 and 135)
(1990) (final rule Nov. 21, 1988). In an advance notice of proposed rule making (December, 1986), the FAA first proposed random drug testing. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See
14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63, 65, 135) (1990). After receiving hundreds of written comments, the
FAA issued a notice of proposed rule making (March 1988). Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453.
See 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63, 65, 121, 135)(1990). Written comments were then filed in response to this notice, and the FAA held a series of public hearings. Bluestein, 908 F.2d
at 453. On Nov. 21, 1988 the final rule was issued. [d.
7. [d. This included those carrying passengers or cargo, scheduled or unscheduled.
[d.

8. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453, n.2.
9. [d. at 453. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1990) (App. I - defining "employer" generally as
all Part 121 and 135 certificate holders, i.e., commercial air carriers, both scheduled and
unscheduled, carrying passengers or cargo, or an air traffic control facility except those
operated by, or under contract with, the FAA or the U.S. military).
10. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. Those tested include: a) flight crew members; b)
flight attendants; c) flight (or ground) instructors; d) flight testing personnel; e) aircraft
dispatchers; f) maintenance personnel; g) aviation security or screening personnel; and h)
air traffic controllers. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1990) (App. I, III).
11. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1990) (App. I, IV).
12. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 ~990).
13. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1990). The procedure for testing employees involves the employee arriving at a "collection site" with photographic
identification, removing any coat or outer garment, then entering a stall and providing
the required urine specimen. Bluestein, at 454. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 40 (1990). A monitor of
the same gender as the employee must remain in the area, but outside the stall. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 454. The monitor inspects the specimen for temperature, volume and
color, and must then have it shipped to an HHS-certified drug testing laboratory. [d.
The laboratory to which the specimen is sent performs an immunoassay test; if it is
positive, a second test is done to confirm the positive test. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 454.
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Employees who cannot offer a satisfactory explanation for a
test that has been confirmed as positive must be removed from
their positions. 14 They may only return to duty upon the recommendation of a Medical Review Officer 11i or the Federal Air
Surgeon. 16
B.

JUDICIAL HISTORY

Upon the FAA's issuance of the rules, petitions for review
were filed in the Fifth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit by commercial aviation employees, the industry's labor
organizations, and an organization of aviation employees and
employers. 17 The petitions were consolidated m this
proceeding. 18
Petitioners claimed that the drug testing regulations are unreasonable searches in violation of the fourth amendment. 19
Also, petitioners argued that the FAA failed to give a satisfactory explanation for its decision to require random drug testing,
therefore violating section lO(e) of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 20
III.
A.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE

In analyzing the potential fourth amendment violation, the
Ninth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions in National Treasury Union v. Von Raab 21 and Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Association. 22
The regulations also require pre-employment testing, post-accident testing, testing at
certain employees' first medical examinations, testing based on reasonable cause, and
testing after returning to duty following a positive test or a refusal to test. [d. at 453-54
n.3.
14. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 454.
15. [d. The employee's Medical Review Officer must be a qualified physician. [d.
16. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 454.
17. [d.
18. [d.

19. [d. See supra note 4 for language of fourth amendment.
20. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1990) (reproduced in part, supra note 5).
21. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). The Court upheld a Customs Service random drug testing program. Id.
22. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). The Court upheld railroads testing those employees in-
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In Von Raab, the Court upheld a United States Customs
Service requirement that employees competing for promotions
or transfers to particular positions submit to urinalysis. 23 In
Skinner, the Court upheld a Federal Railroad Administration
program requiring that railroad companies perform blood and
urine tests on train workers involved in major railroad accidents;
breath and urine testing are permitted of an employee who violates certain safety rules/014
In Bluestein, the Ninth Circuit noted that certain threshold
fourth amendment questions had been answered by Von Raab
and Skinner/olD First, drug testing, required by government regulations and performed by private employers, is subject to constitutional restrictions. 26 Second, urinalysis constitutes a search
under the fourth amendment because it intrudes upon society's
reasonable expectations of privacy.27 Third, the standard fourth
amendment requirements of a warrant and probable cause may
not always apply in the drug testing context. 28
The Ninth Circuit compared the government's need for
testing U.S. Customs employees in Von Raab to the government's need to test aviation personnel in Bluestein and found
that clearly the FAA rules serve needs "beyond the normal need
for law enforcement. "29 In both cases, the testing rules were set
up to deter drug use among employees in either safety-sensitive
or security-sensitive positions. 30 The court also observed that
both the FAA drug testing rules and those in Von Raab provide
that the employee's consent is necessary for test results to be
used in a criminal prosecution of the employee. 31
volved in a train accident or safety rule violation. [d.
23. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 454.
24. [d. at 454-55.
25. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455.
26. [d. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411-12.
27. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455 (citing Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413; accord Von Raab,
109 S. Ct. at 1390).
28. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455. If a search "serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement," the government's interests must be balanced against the individual's privacy expectations to find whether requiring a warrant
or probable cause in that instance would be impractical. [d. (quoting Von Raab, 109 S.
Ct. at 1390).
29. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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The court next balanced the government's interests against
the employee's privacy interest. 32 The court stated that it was
primarily guided by Von Raab because, like Von Raab, the FAA
testing program is random and does not require any level of individualized suspicion or suspicious activity (e.g., a safety violation}.33 The Court in Von Raab had reasoned that the government's compelling interest in preventing drug use, in positions 34
where it might endanger the Nation's borders or its citizens, outweighed the privacy interests of employees seeking promotions
to such positions. 311
Applying the Von Raab reasoning, the Ninth Circuit concluded that government's interest in preventing drug use by employees in safety-sensitive positions in the aviation industry is at
least as strong as the interest in preventing drug use by Customs
officers. 36
In responding to the argument that the FAA failed to show
a sufficiently high level of drug use in the industry to warrant its
testing program, the Ninth Circuit observed that in Von Raab,
the Customs Service testing plan had not been implemented in
response to any perceived drug problem among their employees. 37 Nevertheless, the Court in that case upheld the testing because of its deterrent purposes and the potential for grave
harm. 38 The Ninth Circuit noted that the FAA administrative
record did contain some evidence of drug use by airline employees. 39 The court reasoned that harm caused by an airplane crash
32.Id.
33. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455. In contrast, the drug testing in Skinner was limited
to employees involved in a safety rule violation or a major train accident. Id.
34. Id. Customs Service positions subjected to drug testing involved either: 1) direct
involvement in drug-related law enforcement; 2) a requirement that the employee carry a
firearm; or, 3) a requirement that the employee handle "classified" material. The Court
upheld testing in the first two position types and remanded the third category for clarification. Id.
35. Id. at 455-56. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
36. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456.
37. Id. In Von Raab, there was evidence that out of 3,600 employees tested for
drugs, only five tested positive. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at
1394.
38. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395.
39. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456. The evidence showed that a number of pilots and
other crew members had been treated for cocaine addiction or overdoses; that tests done
within the industry found drug use by pilots and mechanics; and drugs were present in
the bodies of pilots in two plane crashes. Id.
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is at least as great as that caused by drug impairment within
Customs Service employment. 4o Therefore, the court concluded
that the need for the FAA's random drug testing program
equaled, if not exceeded, that for the program approved in Von
Raab:u
Petitioners also contended that the FAA testing program invaded more deeply on privacy interests than the program in Von
Raab violated the privacy interests of the Customs Service employees. 42 They noted that the FAA allows immediate testing
(no notice), while the Customs Service program requires at least
five days' notice and is only triggered by specific events (i.e., applying for promotions or transfers).4s
The Ninth Circuit, however, found the provision for random
testing without notice insufficient to "tip the scales" against the
FAA drug testing program. 44 The court noted that the reasoning
of the D.C. Circuit court in Harmon v. Thornburgh,4~ was persuasive. 4s In Harmon, a Justice Department testing plan was
upheld that provided for random testing with notice as slight as
within two hours of the scheduled testing." The D.C. circuit
concluded that even though the Justice Department testing plan
was random in nature, that was insufficient to require undertaking a different analysis from that applied by the Court in Von
Raab. 48 The Ninth Circuit asserted that random drug testing in
particular weighs more heavily (than privacy interests) in view
of the FAA's rational conclusion that random testing without.
advance notice will deter drug use more than testing with advance notice.'e
40. [d.
41. [d.

42. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456.
43. [d.
44. [d. at 456-57.

45. 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), reh 'g denied, (Sept. I, 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 865 (1990). The D.C. Circuit court upheld a random urinalysis drug testing program
so far as testing those employees holding top secret national security clearances. Harmon
v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
46. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457.
47. [d. See Harmon, 878 F.2d at 486.
48. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489.
49. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457. The court noted three other decisions upholding random drug testing following Von Raab: American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner,
885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (random urine drug testing upheld for Department of
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The court dismissed the argument that the FAA plan gives
employers too much discretion. 50 The Ninth Circuit maintained
that the strict randomness requirements makes certain that no
employer will have discretion as to which employees should be
tested. 51 Further, employers' discretion in structuring their testing programs will be restricted by collective bargaining and the
mandatory FAA approval of each employer's plan. 52
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that the potential
fourth amendment violation was substantially indistinguishable
from the fourth amendment issue decided by the Court in Von
Raab. 53 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit rejected petitioners'
constitutional challenge to the FAA testing program. 54
B.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT CHALLENGE

The Ninth Circuit determined that the claim that the
FAA's decision was arbitrary and capriCious in violation of section lO(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act,55 was
meritless. 56
The court found that the FAA had explained why it chose
to require random drug testing; there was more evidence supporting the effectiveness of random testing than of non-random
programs. 57 The court also concluded that the FAA's decision
that safety interests outweigh privacy interests in this context
was a reasonable decision, which could not be overruled as arbiTransportation employees in positions having a direct impact on public health, safety, or
national security); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir.
1989)(upheld the Army's random drug urinalysis of certain of its civilian employees);
Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989) (Army's random drug testing on certain
civilian employees at a chemical weapons plant was upheld.) Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457
n.8.
50. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457.
51. [d.
52. [d. The court noted the FAA's statement that it will review each employer's
programs to ensure that discretion is in fact properly limited under each plan. [d. at 457

n.9.

53. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457.
54. [d.

55. [d. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1990), reproduced in part supra note 19.
56. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457.
57. [d. (citing 14 C.F.R. pt 121 (1990».
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trary and capricious. liS
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that the
FAA's decision to include flight attendants in the drug testing
program was inconsistent with previous FAA decisions regarding
on-duty time. liS The court found no conflict between the duty
time decisions and the inclusion of flight attendants in the drug
testing program, since the FAA had found no evidence of a correlation between flight attendant duty time and risk to passengers. 60 The court noted, however, that impaired performance of
attendants can at times be a public safety consideration, and
that the administrative record supported the FAA finding that
flight attendant positions are in fact safety-sensitive. 61 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit held that the FAA had acted within its authority
in mandating random drug testing of flight attendants. 62
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the FAA's
random drug testing regulations. The court concluded that the
agency's decision to require random testing of employees in the
aviation industry (whose positions affect public safety) was not
arbitrary and capricious. Random drug testing was shown by the
FAA to be a greater deterrent against drug use than non-random
testing. In balancing the government's safety interests against
the individual's privacy interests, the court upheld the FAA's
decision that public safety concerns outweighed privacy concerns under these circumstances.
Carol A. Farmer*

58. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457.
59. [d. The FAA duty time decisions denied petitions of flight attendants to establish safety rules limiting their on-duty time. [d.
60. [d. at 457.

61. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457 n.10. Specifically, flight attendants must perform important safety functions in emergencies, and are also routinely in charge of ensuring
safely stored luggage and proper closing and locking of airplane doors prior to departure.
[d. at 457-58 n.10.
62. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 458.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
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HIGH TECH GAYS u. DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY CLEARANCE
OFFICE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES
THE CLASS STATUS OF HOMOSEXUALS
FOR EQUAL PROTECTION PURPOSES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office/ a class action suit,2 the Ninth Circuit held that
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class 3
under the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's
due process clause.' Therefore, the court determined that the
1. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1990) (per Brunetti, J.; the other panel members were Leavy, J., and Curtis, J., senior
U.S. District Judge, Central District of California, sitting by designation), reh'g en banc
denied, 909 F.2d 375 (1990).
2. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565. The plaintiff class consisted of: "All gay per·
sons who, since January 1982, have applied for, are now applying for, or may in the
future apply for Secret or Top Secret industrial clearances from DISCO, in any of the
eight DIS regions in the country, and all gay persons who, since January, 1982, have
held, now hold, or may in the future hold such clearances." [d. at n.l.
3. [d. at 574. See infra notes 56·99 and accompanying text for discussion on the
three· tiered standard of review.
The scope of this holding extends to homosexual conduct. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d
at 573. The Ninth Circuit did not discuss whether the holding only applied to gay men
so as to exclude lesbian or bisexual employees of defense contractors. However, the court
stated that the term "homosexual" encompassed both the terms "gay" and "lesbian." [d.
at 565 n.2. In general, the courts do not differ significantly in their treatment of gay men,
lesbian women, or bisexuals. See, e.g., Rich, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the
Wake of Bowers u. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REV. 773 n.2 (1988).
Throughout this Note, the term "gay" and "homosexual" will refer to both lesbian
women, gay men and bisexuals unless otherwise noted.
4. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574. See infra notes 48·51 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the fifth amendment right of equal protection.

81
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homosexual class was only entitled to rational basis review:~ The
court found that actions of the Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office (DISCO)6 did not violate first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and association. 7
II.

FACTS

Plaintiffs brought a class action 6 against the Department of
Defense (DoD) for conducting expanded investigations into the
backgrounds of all gay applicants for Secret and Top Secret
Clearances. 9 The three named plaintiffs, Joel Crawford, Timothy
Dooling and Robert Weston,10 challenged the constitutionality of
5. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571. The court found that the Department of Defense's (000) regulations were rationally based and, in this instance, did not violate
plaintiffs' fifth amendment right to equal protection. Id. at 576.
6. Throughout this Note, the following acronyms will be used:
DIS
Defense Investigative Service
DISCO Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office
DISCR Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review
000
Department of Defense
7. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 580. DISCO recommended denial of Secret security
clearance for the plaintiff Dooling because of sexual perversion; several "homosexual attributes" were cited including membership in a gay organization. Id. at 580. DISCO automatically referred all homosexual applicants to the Directorate for Industrial Security
Clearance Review (hereinafter DISCR) for an expanded investigation. [d. at 568. See
infra notes 23-41 for a discussion of the security clearance process. The court noted that
the plaintiffs had "not shown that membership in a gay organization to be a distinct,
separate, abstract ground for denying security clearances." High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at
580. Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs' right to petition the courts for redress of
grievances was not violated. See id. at 580-81 (dismissing Crawford's first amendment
claim).
8. See supra note 2 for definition of the plaintiff class.
9. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565~
10. Id. at 569. In December of 1981, SRI International, a defense contractor, forwarded the application of Joel Crawford, a gay employee, to DISCO for a Secret industrial clearance. Id.; see also Brief for Appellants at 9, High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-2987). DISCO initially recommended ineligibility based on his promiscuity and his current treatment for an ongoing
schizophreniform disorder. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 580. DISCO forwarded the application to DISCR. Id. The district court found that DISCR denied the clearance because of "homosexual activity and susceptibility to coercion." High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (per Henderson,
J.), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). After receiving correspondence from Crawford's
attorney, DISCR withdrew its decision for further consideration. Id. DISCR then
changed the basis of ineligibility to Crawford's prior use of marijuana. High Tech Gays,
895 F.2d at 580.
In May of 1983, Lockheed, a defense contractor, forwarded Timothy Dooling's application for a Secret industrial clearance to DISCO. Id.; see also Brief for Appellants at 9.
In March of 1984, DISCO referred the application to DISCR for an expanded investiga-
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the policies and practices of DISCO and the Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review (DISCR).l1 The plaintiffs alleged that the expanded investigations and additional procedural hurdles l2 to which heterosexual applicants were not
subjected violated equal protection 13 and denied gay applicants
the rights of free association guaranteed by the first amendment. l " The defendants maintained that their regulations were
tion because of Dooling's admissions relating to Dooling's homosexuality and recommended that he be considered ineligible. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 579. His admissions included "disclosures regarding his visits to gay bathhouses, his membership in
[High Tech Gays) a homosexual organization, his homosexual activities with casual acquaintances, his intention to inform his employer as to his homosexuality, and his intention to continue his homosexual lifestyle in the future .... " Id. Despite DISCO's recommendation, DISCR granted Dooling a Secret clearance. High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1366.
Robert Weston, a gay employee at Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., had been granted
a Secret Clearance. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 569. At the time, DoD guidelines instructed companies not to submit Top Secret applications absent compelling need if the
application contained information which would cause lengthy delays. Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir. 1989) (appeal dismissed solely
because plaintiff failed to address the government's successful assertion of the state
secrets privilege in the lower court). Lockheed believed that these regulations required
non-submittal of applications revealing evidence of homosexuality. Id. Weston's application was not forwarded as it disclosed his membership in a gay organization. High Tech
Gays, 895 F.2d at 569 n.5.
11. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1366.
See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the security clearance
process.
The plaintiffs asked the district court to: 1) declare unconstitutional and enjoin the
DISCO policy of refusing to grant clearances to gays who have participated in homosexual activities in the last 15 years and automatically requiring that applications of gays be
forwarded to DISCR for further proceedings; 2) declare unconstitutional and enjoin the
DIS practice of subjecting gay applicants to extensive additional investigations; 3) declare unconstitutional DISCO's use of 'five reasons' to recommend denial of plaintiffDooling's clearance; 4) declare unconstitutional DISCR's processing of plaintiff-Crawford's application subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit; and 5) purge the Defense Central Index of Investigations of derogatory information about all class members. High
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1367.
Plaintiffs also sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from continuing to
enforce such policies. I d.
12. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at
1364, 1366. The plaintiffs did not specifically allege that the defendants, as a policy,
denied security clearances to all gay applicants. Id. at 1366. The government had granted
a Secret clearance to Dooling, one of the class representatives. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d
at 569.
13. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1367.
See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text for discussion of the fifth amendment's
applicability to these issues.
14. High Tech Gays v. Defense ·Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1367,
1377-78.
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rationally based. IIi
15. Id. at 1373. The defendants presented the following evidence supporting their
policy with respect to gays:
1) Plaintiffs Crawford and Dooling allegedly had emotional problems adjusting to
their sexual orientation. Id. at 1374.
2) A newspaper account quoted a person convicted for stealing secret documents
who at his sentencing hearing said that he stole "to prove ... I could be a man and still
be gay." Id.
3) John Donnelly, an Assistant Deputy for Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security, concluded that hostile intelligence agencies often attempt to
exploit human weaknesses including sexual vulnerability. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at
576 (discussing John Donnelly's Declaration in Support of DoD's Motion for New Trial
(Reconsideration) at 3). He noted that such agencies evaluate each individual with the
desired access and assess the best approach to compromise them. Id.
4) Major Francis R. Short, USMC, Judge Advocate in the United States Marine
Corps, stated that at the trial of Sergeant Lonetree, the court accepted the testimony of
Mr. John Barron as an expert. Id. at 576 (discussing Major Francis R. Short's Declaration in Support of DoD's Motion for a New Trial). Major Short declared that Mr. Barron
testified: "[TJhe KGB will attempt to identify those who are . .. experiencing problems
with . .. homosexuality . ... " Id. at 577 (emphasis added by the Ninth Circuit) (discussing Major Short's Declaration at 1-2). Barron testified that the KGB entrapped a Canadian ambassador to the Soviet Union through the exploitation of a homosexual relationship.ld.
5) Barron stated that the KGB believes "homosexuality often is accompanied by
personality disorders that make the victim potentially unstable and vulnerable to adroit
manipulation." Id. (discussing BARRON, KGB THE SECRET WORK OF SOVIET SECRET
AGENTS 280 (1974)). The KGB believes that as gays are aware they are different and this
makes them want to seek revenge against society. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp at 1374.
6) Sergeant Lonetree made sworn statements to special agents of the Naval Investigative Service relating a meeting with a KGB officer. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 577.
Extracts of the statements revealed that the KGB officer specifically asked Lonetree "to
tell him who were the homosexuals . .. and people who were exploitable who worked in
the embassy as civilians." Id. (emphasis added by the Ninth Circuit) (discussing Statement of Sgt. Lonetree, Dec. 29, 1986).
The plaintiffs, however, presented the following evidence that it was irrational to
treat gays differently from heterosexuals:
1) The American Psychiatric Association in a position statement found that homosexuality per se is one form of sexual behavior and, like other forms which are not by
themselves psychiatric disorders, is not considered a mental disorder. High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1374 (discussing AM. PSYCHIATRIC
Assoc., POSITION STATEMENT ON HOMOSEXUALITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS (Dec. 15, 1973)). The
Association also declared that "[hlomosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities." Resolution of the
American Psychological Association, January 1975.
2) The United States Public Health Service no longer considers homosexuality to be
a mental disorder and refuses to issue medical certificates solely on the basis of homosexuality. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1374-75
(discussing Hill v. United States INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1472, 1481 (9th Cir. 1983) (the
Health Service has recognized that "current and generally accepted canons of medical
practice" do not consider homosexuality per se to be a psychiatric disorder)).
3) At Senate subcommittee hearings,the F.B.I. and the Defense Intelligence Agency
produced no evidence of persons being blackmailed because of homosexuality. Id. at
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The district court found that classifications 16 such as the
DoD security clearance regulations which disadvantage gays
must either withstand heightened scrutiny, as gay people are a
quasi-suspect class,17 or must withstand strict scrutiny as they
violate the right of gays to engage in any homosexual activity,
not merely sodomy, and thus impinge upon their exercise of a
fundamental right. IS Further, even if neither strict nor heightened scrutiny were applied, there was no rational basis for subjecting all gay applicants to expanded investigations. 19 The dis1375 (discussing Federal Government Security Clearance Programs: Hearings Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 171-87,913-26 (1985». Of approximately 40
significant espionage cases, only two involved homosexuals and none involved blackmail.
Id.
4) A factual study allegedly demonstrated that of 19 gay applicants for security
clearances who were subjected to expanded investigations, only two were denied security
clearances. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575 (discussing Plaintiffs' Brief Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7).
5) In a deposition, Richard Olinger, a former manager of the Government Security
Department at Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, told of two conferences he attended while at Lockheed regarding security concerns. Id. at 575-76 (discussing Plaintiffs' Brief Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment at 9). He stated' that the question
of whether homosexuality posed a security risk was not discussed at these conferences.
Id.
16. See infra notes 52-99 and accompanying text for discussion of various classifications under equal protection review.
17. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1368.
The district court reasoned that factors warranting heightened scrutiny for gender classifications are also present in classifications based on sexual orientation. Id. at 1369. The
sex characteristic bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society and
reflect an outmoded notion of the relative capabilities of the sexes. Id.
The court also observed that pervasive discrimination against gays has seriously impaired their ability to gain a politically viable voice for their view in state and local
legislatures and in Congress. Id. at 1370. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text
for discussion of heightened scrutiny and quasi-suspect classes.
18. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1370.
The district court found that DoD regulations required expanded investigation for any
homosexual activity. Id. The court observed that states are only allowed to criminalize
homosexual sodomy. Id. at 1370-71 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
which did not address whether gays may engage in other activities such as kissing, holding hands, and caressing). See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text for discussion
of Hardwick.
The district court held that the right to privacy extends to all persons and mandates
a fundamental right to engage in affectional and sexual activity that has not been traditionally proscribed as sodomy. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
668 F. Supp. at 1372. For example, the district court found that the Constitution protects the freedom to express physically basic human emotions and feelings, the right to
express affection, attraction, and love for another human being through sexual activity
not proscribed by Hardwick. Id.
19. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1373.
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trict court held that the DoD violated the plaintiffs' equal
protection rights 20 and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment;21 DISCO appealed. 22
III.
A.

BACKGROUND
SUMMARY OF THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS

If a defense contractor employee needs a Secret or Top Secret clearance to perform his job, the contractor submits an application to the DoD.23 The DoD forwards a Secret clearance application to DISCO,24 who conducts a record check with the FBI
and the Defense Central Intelligence Index. 2~ The investigation
may also include records checks with the CIA, the State Department, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Immigration
20. [d. at 1373. The plaintiffs pleaded their case on the assumption that either the
first or fifth amendment contains an equal protection clause. [d. at 1367.
21. [d. at 1377. The district court enjoined the DoD from enforcing its regulations
with respect to other members of the class for which plaintiffs were representatives. [d.
at 1379. Summary judgment shall be granted if evidence shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
22. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 565 (9th
Cir. 1990). DISCO filed motions for stay pending appeal and for reconsideration based
on new evidence that foreign intelligence services target gays. [d. at 568-70. The district
court granted the motion for stay, but denied the motion for reconsideration. [d. at 56970.
DISCO appealed the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and
sought reversal of the district court's grant of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment based on the following issues:
1) the district court's determination that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class for
purposes of equal protection review;
2) the application of the "heightened scrutiny" standard to the review of DoD
regulations;
3) the court's determination that plaintiff's evidence and affidavits made a sufficient
showing that the DoD does not have a rational basis for its expanded security investigation of homosexuals;
4) the determination that the DoD did not meet its burden of persuasion by demonstrating that its policies and procedures for homosexuals are rationally related to permissible ends; and
5) the court's finding that DISCO's use of mere membership in a 'gay organization'
as grounds to refuse a clearance and automatically requiring additional investigation violated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights. [d. at 570-79 (quoting High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1378).
23. 32 C.F.R. §§ 154.30-.31 (1989).
24. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565-66.
25. [d. at 566 (discussing 32 C.F.R. § 154.3(m); DoD 5200.2-R, app. B (1979».
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and Naturalization Service. 26 For a Top Secret clearance application, the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) conducts a
"Background Investigation. "27
DISCO uses guidelines set forth as part of the DoD Personnel Security Program 28 in determining whether there is adverse
information 29 that will prevent the granting of clearance. 3o If adverse information is uncovered, DISCO will conduct an expanded investigation to substantiate or disprove the information. 31 In addition, a personal interview of the applicant is
conducted. 32 Thereafter, DISCO will grant the Secret clearance
unless that would be inconsistent with the national interest, in
which case the application is forwarded to DISCR.33 A similar
procedure is followed for Top Secret Clearances. 3ol
DISCR evaluates referrals using criteria set forth in DoD directives 35 and determines whether or not to grant a clearance. 36
The DIS Manual for Personnel Security Investigations estab26. [d. A record check similar to that done with the FBI is done with these agencies.
[d.
27. [d. A Background Investigation includes a "local records check" and interviews
with personal sources. [d.
28. 32 CFR pt. 154, app. 0 (1989)
29. [d. Background Investigations must be considered devoid of significant adverse
information unless they contain, for example, information characterized as "[m]ental,
nervous, emotional, psychological, psychiatric, or character disorders .... " [d. at 504 § 4.
Adverse information "impunge[s] the subject's moral character, threaten[s] the subject's
future federal employment, raisers] the question of subject's security clearability; or [is]
otherwise stigmatizing." High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 566 (discussing 32 C.FR §
154.8(i)(2) (1989».
30. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 566 (discussing DoD 5200.2-R, app. E (1979».
31. 32 C.FR § 154.8(j) (1989). The adverse information must be relevant to a security determination. [d.
32. [d. at § 154.8(i)(2).
33. [d. at §§ 155.2(c), 155.7(a).
34. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 566, 568; see 32 C.FR §§ 155.2(c), 155.7(a) (1989).
35. 32 C.FR § 154.6(b) (1989). For example, in determining whether a person is
eligible for clearances, "all available information, the person's loyalty, reliability, and
trustworthiness [must be] such that entrusting the person with classified information ...
is clearly consistent with the interests of national security." [d.
The decision must be an overall common sense determination based on all available
facts. [d. at § 154.7. The criteria for determining ineligibility for a clearance includes
"[a]cts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of moral turpitude, poor judgment,
or lack of regard for the laws of society." [d. at § 154.7(q). Disqualifying factors under
sexual misconduct are listed and include acts performed in public places, recent adultery, child molesting, and sodomy. [d. at pt. 154, app. H.
36. [d. at § 155.7(b).
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lishes operational, investigative, and procedural policy.37 Allegations of heterosexual conduct between consenting adults are normally ignored. 38 However, other deviant sexual conduct,39 which
may cast doubt on the individual's morality, emotional or
mental stability and may raise questions as to susceptibility to
coercion is investigated. 40 DISCO unconditionally refers all gay
applicants to the DISCR for expanded investigations for both
types of clearances. 41
B.

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment42
guarantees that all persons similarly situated are to be treated
alike. 43 The equal protection clause mandates that the states refrain from enacting any statute or regulation which invidiously
discriminates against a group of persons." A statute or regulation also cannot discriminate against people based on characteristics irrelevant to a constitutional purpose. 41i
37. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 568 (discussing Defense Investigative Service Manual DIS 20-1-M (1985».
38. [d. (discussing DIS 20-1-M ~ 4-10, at 4-5 (1985». However, extramarital sexual
relations are considered legitimate grounds for inquiry when the potential for undue infiuence exists. [d.
39. [d. Deviant sexual conduct includes exhibitionism, sadism, and voyeurism. [d.
40. [d. (discussing DIS 20-1-M, ~ 4-11, at 4-5, 4-6 (1985».
41. [d. at 568.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that:
"[n)o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
[d.

43. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1954) (zoning
ordinance, as applied, resulted in the denial of a special use permit for construction of a
group home for the mentally retarded) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982».
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490-91 n.5 (1954) (segregation
in public schools in various states alleged to deprive black children of their equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment). [d. In Brown, the Court observed that the
fourteenth amendment contains a positive immunity: the right of blacks to exemption
from "unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored . .. implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others
enjoy, and [from) discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race." [d. (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964) (state statute prohibited unmarried interracial couples from habitually occupying the same room at night;
punishment of promiscuity with one racial group and not with another was not related to
state's interest in preventing breaches of basic concepts of sexual decency). See Note,
The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1299 (1985) [hereinafter Homosexuality as a Suspect
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The fourteenth amendment applies to the states but not to
the federal government. 48 In Bolling v. Sharpe,47 the United
States Supreme Court observed that the fifth amendment's due
process clause48 contains an equal protection requirement. 4e
Therefore, fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantees
apply to the federal government through the fifth amendment. llo
The analytic approach to a fifth amendment equal protection claim mirrors the approach used to review a fourteenth
amendment claim. III A court begins its review by determining
Classification] .
46. See United States v. Sperry Corp, 110 S. Ct. 387, 396 (1989) (equal protection
claim against the United States brought under the fifth amendment due process clause);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (segregation of public schools in the District
of Columbia alleged to deprive black children of their due process rights under the fifth
amendment).
47. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution
provides, in part "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... " [d. The fifth amendment does not contain an equal protection
clause. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (statute mandated loss of citizenship
to a naturalized citizen if the citizen resided continuously for three years in the territory
of the foreign state of which he was formerly a national); Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
49. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499·500 (equal protection and due process are not mutually exclusive concepts). In Bolling, the Court observed that the fifth and not the fourteenth amendment applies to the District of Columbia. [d. at 498-99. However, the Court
found that while not interchangeable, "concepts of equal protection and due process,
both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." [d. The
Court found that governmental discrimination which violates equal protection guarantees may be so unjustifiable as to also violate due process. [d. (discussing Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954». The Court held that segregation of public schools in the
District of Columbia deprived black schoolchildren of their fifth amendment right to due
process as such discrimination had deprived them of equal protection. [d. at 499-500.
See also Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. 387, 396 (1989) (user fees, authorized by § 502 of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, charged against awards received by claimants from
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, did not violate the due process clause equal
protection component); INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 885 (1988) (statute authorized
the Commissioner of Immigration and·Naturalization to designate representatives to receive petitions, conduct hearings, and grant naturalization outside the United States; the
naturalization officer's authority was revoked for a nine-month period between 1945 and
1946; Filipino nationals who had served the United States Armed Forces during World
War II sought citizenship pursuant to the statute); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636,638 n.2, 643-53 (1975) (Act of Congress granted survivors' benefits based on earnings
of a deceased husband and father both to the widow and to the couple's minor children
in her care but granted benefits based on the earnings of a deceased wife and mother
only to the minor children and not to the widower).
50. See Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 396; Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 885; Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. at 638 n.2; Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500.
51. E.g., Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 638 n.2 (approach to fifth amendment equal protection claims precisely the same as fourteenth amendment equal protection claims); see
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the standard of review to apply to the challenged classification:
strict,1I2 heightened,1I3 or rational. basis ll4 scrutiny,lIl1
1.

Strict Scrutiny

Strict scrutiny is applied to suspect classes ll6 and is generally fatal to· legislative or regulatory classifications,II7 Under
also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (statute provided
that spouses of male Air Force officers were dependents for purposes of medical, dental
and housing benefits but that spouses of female officers were not dependents, unless they
were in fact dependent for over one half of their support; denial of dependent status and
resulting benefits to Air Force officer's spouse alleged to deny servicewoman of due pro·
cess). In Frontiero, a fifth amendment claim was analyzed using fourteenth amendment
pre'cedent. See id.
52. See infra notes 56-91 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1954).
56. See Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at 1297-98. The
courts generally base the determination of who is a suspect class on the model of race.
Id. See infra notes 59-68 for discussion of classes afforded suspect class status. In practice, courts may consider the possible state interests which would support the classification as part of determining who is afforded suspect class status. Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, at 1298.
Apart from the race model, suspect status has been asserted to protect "discrete and
insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938)
(Congress prohibited the interstate shipment of "filled" milk; legislation upheld over
claimed due process violation).
57. See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. I, 8 (1972). Groups qualifying for strict scrutiny are said to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973). See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text
for discussion of Rodriguez.
Whether the standard of review applied has any effect on the outcome of any case
has been questioned. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (Oklahoma statutes prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21
and females under the age of 18). In Craig, Justice Stevens observed that:
[W)hat has become known as the [tiered) analysis of equal
protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court
has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single
standard in a reasonably consistent fashion .... I have always
asked myself whether I could find a "rational basis" for the
classification at issue. The term "rational" ... includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe
that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose
that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class. Thus, the word "rational" ... includes elements of
legitimacy and neutrality ....
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strict scrutiny, legislation is constitutional only if it
tailored to serve a compelling ll8 state interest. liS

91
IS

suitably

The classification that most clearly qualifies for suspect
class treatment under the fourteenth amendment are those
based on race. 60 In Palmore v. Sidoti,6} the Court observed that
Id. (emphasis added).
58. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The Court has attached no particular significance to the varied characterizations of a "compelling" state interest. In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (statute prohibited aliens from practicing law; permissible and substantial interest required). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (statute required residence in the state for one year and in the county for three months as a prerequisite for registration to vote; important interest required); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 375 (1971) (several states had made eligibility for welfare benefits conditioned
upon citizenship or, in the case of aliens, upon having resided in the country for a specified number of years; compelling interest required); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 11
(1967) (statue prohibited miscegenation; overriding interest required); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (overriding statutory purpose).
59. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citing McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192).
As strict scrutiny is generally fatal to legislative classifications, this aspect of the analysis
(considering the state's interests) is often slighted. See Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, supra note 45, at 1298. The consideration of what state interests are permissible has become more important with the advent of intermediate levels of scrutiny
as such consideration addresses the issue of what majoritarian goals are permissible
under the equal protection clause. Id. In short, how is a court to know -"whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities [is) a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily ... relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry[?)" Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 nA.
This controversial issue is beyond the scope of this Note. However, as the Constitution itself protects religious, national and racial minorities, former Judge Bork has suggested that the minorities Justice Stone referred to in Carolene Products are those who
cannot win their battles in the political process because of prejudice. R. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA, 58-61 (1990). Judge Bork criticized Stone's "more searching judicial inquiry" as allowing Justices to inject into the Constitution their own subjective
values and policy preferences - to, in effect, overrule democratic majorities. Id. at 61.
60. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (core purpose of the fourteenth amendment is to
end all governmentally imposed race discrimination); Loving, 388 U.S. at 10 (central purpose is to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination); McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192 (central purpose is to eliminate racial discrimination by the states
and thereby renders racial classifications constitutionally suspect); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497,499 (1954) (classifications based on race are constitutionally suspect); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 n.5 (1954) (while prohibitory, also has a positive immunity: the right for blacks to be exempt from legislation aimed directly at them as
blacks and the right to be exempt from legal discrimination implying inferiority in civil
society); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (Executive Order excluded citizens of Japanese origin from a West Coast military area and required them to
remain in their residences from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.; restrictions curtailing the civil rights of
a single racial group are suspect); see also, Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,
supra note 45, at 1298.
61. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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racial classifications deserve the most exacting scrutiny as classifying persons according to race likely reflects prejudice rather
than legitimate public concerns. 62 Classifications based on "national origin" are extended strict scrutiny as national origin is
similar to race. 6S Suspect class status has also been extended to
alienage classifications. 64
62. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (preventing possible injury and social stigmatization of
child). Further, private biases are impermissible considerations in determining a child's
custody. [d. at 433.
63. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Illinois statute allowed illegitimate children to inherit
by intestate succession only from their mothers while legitimate children could inherit
by intestate succession from both parents). Justice Rehnquist observed that the Framers
obviously meant the equal protection clause to apply to national origin, the "first cousin"
of race. [d.; Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 425-27 (1948) (Murphy,
J., concurring) (California statute barred issuing commercial fishing licenses to persons
"ineligible to citizenship"; the purpose of such legislation, directed against aliens of Japanese birth, was to give effect to racial animosity); Jamil v. Secretary, Dept. of Defense,
910 F.2d 1203, 1205 (4th Cir. 1990) (DoD employee discharged for failure. to obtain a
Top Secret security clearance; plaintiff had Asian-American parents living abroad and
had defaulted on a student loan). In Jamil, the court observed that if the plaintiff had
been dismissed because of his national origin, he would have had a valid equal protection
claim. [d. at 1209.
Classifications based on race and national origin are usually invalidated as the state
interests are not compelling. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432-33 (state court's divestment of
child from natural mother because she married a black man held unconstitutional; state
interest in preventing injury from private biases). In Palmore, the Court observed that
racial classifications are invalidated if they show invidious discrimination even if the
seeming purpose of the classification is to protect against acknowledged discrimination.
[d. at 433-34. See also Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (state interest in preserving racial pride,
integrity and preventing the corruption of blood was not a legitimate, independent, overriding basis for anti-miscegenation laws; such classifications amount to invidious discrimination and were characterized as designed to maintain white supremacy); Bolling, 347
U.S. at 499-500 (racial segregation is unjustifiable discrimination); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. at 493 (schools segregated pursuant to state laws; interest in providing
equal educational opportunities); but contra McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 193 (interest in
preventing illicit extra- and pre-marital promiscuity and other basic notions of sexual
decency); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-19 (the government's interest in protecting against
espionage and sabotage deemed compelling).
These types of classifications are also invalidated where they are not suitably tailored to serve legitimate interests. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192-93 (Florida statute
punishing unmarried interracial couples and not couples of the same race who cohabitate
in the same room at night amounts to invidious discrimination; law did not have general
application); Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500 (segregation in public education is not reasonably
related to a proper governmental objective); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
at 493 (segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race is not reasonably related to providing black children with equal educational opportunities). But see
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (classification was related to government interest as the government had grounds to believe that persons constituting threat to national security
could not be isolated and separately dealt with).
64. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n.5
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Until the mid-1970s, the Court lacked coherent principles to
determine what standard of review applied to non-racial classifications.6~ In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,66 the
(state barred aliens from becoming notary publics; strict scrutiny applied as the actual
function of a notary public is ministerial and not policymaking); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717,720-21 (1973) (state court rule prohibited resident aliens from taking the bar examination solely because of lack of citizenship; classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (state law provided that
only U.S. citizens could hold permanent positions in the competitive class of the state
civil service); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (states denied welfare benefits to resident aliens or to aliens who had not resided in the United States for a certain
number of years; aliens are a prime example of a discrete and insular minority).
But contra Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979) (statute prohibited permanent certification of non-U.S. citizens from teaching positions unless the applicant manifested an intent to seek U.S. citizenship; rational basis standard applied as teaching is a
governmental function); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (statute prohibited
employing aliens as state troopers; rational basis scrutiny applied as the police execute
government policies and the right to govern may be reserved to a state's citizens). In
Foley, the Court observed that some limitations on aliens do not require strict scrutiny
review. Id. at 294 (citing Dougall, 413 U.S. at 648 (the Court observed that not alllimitations on aliens are unconstitutional».
Alienage classifications are invalidated if the state lacks a compelling interest.
Bernal, 467 U.S. at 227 (interest that notaries be reasonably familiar with state law or
ensuring the later availability of notaries' testimony); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722-23
(assuring general fitness requisite of persons licensed to practice law); Dougall, 413 U.S.
at 641 (having the undivided loyalty of employees without the potential impairment of
judgment attendant with foreign citizenship); Richardson, 403 U.S. at 372 (state's interest in reserving limited welfare benefits for own citizens inadequate to justify denial of
the necessities of life (welfare benefits) to aliens). But contra Norwick, 441 U.S. at 77
(inculcating children with the fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system); Foley, 435 U.S. at 296 (legitimate to have citizens employed
as police officers as they execute broad public policy).
Alienage classifications are also invalidated where they are not necessarily related to
accomplishing its purpose. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722 (the statute must be necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest). See also
Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219, 227 (interest must be furthered by the least restrictive means
available); Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643 (the means the state employs must be precisely
drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose).
But contra Norwick, 441 U.S. at 80 (rational relationship required; citizenship requirement applicable to teaching in the public schools was carefully framed to serve its
purpose as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have demonstrated their unwillingness to obtain citizenship). Foley, 435 U.S. at 296 (state must only show a rational
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification).
In Foley, the government's interest (the right of the public to ensure government by its
own peers), justified the classification. Id. at 296-97. The reservation of policy-making
positions to its citizens was within the State's constitutional prerogatives. Id.
65. Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at 1297; see City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that the
Court had not delineated any well defined standards in the area of equal protection and
that the Court's precedent reflected only judgmental responses to differing classifications. Id. at 451.
66. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Mexican-American parents instituted a class action suit on
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Court developed general criteria describing which groups warrant the strict scrutiny standard. 67 The group must be saddled
with disabilities,68 subjected to a history of discrimination,611 and
behalf of school children of minority groups or poor families who resided in school districts having a low property tax base). In Rodriguez, the state supplied roughly half of all
public school funds. Id. at 9. The school districts supplemented their revenues from ad
valorem taxes on property within each jurisdiction. [d. at 10-11. The plaintiff-class
claimed this reliance on local property taxes favored the more affluent districts in violation of equal protection. See id. at 16. The Court found that substantial interdistrict
disparities in school expenditures did in fact exist. Id. at 15. However, the Court found
that the Texas system did not operate to the disadvantage of any identifiable suspect
class. Id. at 28-29. Wealth discrimination, where poor persons receive less expensive educations than more affluent persons, is not a suspect classification as the defined classes of
poor schoolchildren were not absolutely deprived of an education. [d. at 25. Sec also,
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987) (amendments to the AFDC program requiring that a family's eligibility for benefits must take into account the income of all
parents, brothers and sisters living in the same home; close relatives are not a suspect or
quasi-suspect class) (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313-15 (1976) (per curiam) (classification called for the mandatory retirement of uniformed state police officers at age 50 upheld as it rationally protects the public by assuring physical preparedness of police)).
67. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. However, the general characteristics of a group may
play much less a role than the legitimacy of the perceived state interest in determining
whether the group is a suspect class. See Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,
supra note 45, at 1298.
68. Id. at 28. In determining class status for equal protection analysis, the disability
that a class suffers from is important if it is one that society has imposed because of
stereotyped characteristics: an irrational conclusion about the abilities of a class made
after considering an irrelevant class trait or characteristic. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S.
at 441-42; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
When individuals in a group affected by a statute have distinguishing characteristics
relevant to the interests of a state, the state has the authority to implement the statute if
the statute bears a rational relationship to the legitimate interest. City of Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 441. In City of Cleburne, the Court found that mentally retarded persons have a
reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world. [d. at 442. Consequently, mental retardation is a classification that only requires rational basis review. Id.
at 442.
But with respect to gender classifications, the Court noted that "the sex characteristic" usually bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. [d. at 440-41.
Similarly, the Court has observed that illegitimacy is beyond an individual's control and
bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. Id.
at 441 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (provision in Social Security
Act denied presumptions of dependency to illegitimate but not legitimate children for
determining survivor's benefits)). In Mathews, the Court observed that illegitimate children have suffered disabilities in the past; however, discrimination against illegitimates
had never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political
discrimination against women and blacks. Id. at 506 (rejecting a strict scrutiny standard); but contra Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (statute prohibited a mother
from initiating a paternity suit to identify the father of an illegitimate child for child
support if the child is more than two years old; heightened scrutiny applied). See also
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (although the aged suffer from discrimination they are not subjected to unique disabilities that are based on stereotypes).
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have been banished to a position of political powerlessness. 70
The immutability of the group's identifying trait should also be
considered. 71
Strict scrutiny review is also applied to statutory classifications which burden a fundamental right. 72 Fundamental rights
are interests implicit in the concept of ordered liberty73 or are
deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition. 74 In Rodri69. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (a history of purposeful, unequal treatment). The
Court found in Rodriguez, under wealth classifications, precise equal advantages are not
required. [d. at 24. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (close relatives have not
been subjected to discrimination); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (the aged have not experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment).
70. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443 (mentally retarded individuals are not politically powerless as their needs have been addressed by
lawmakers); Castillo, 477 U.S. at 638 (close relatives are not politically powerless).
See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (discussing the "presumption of constitutionality" when legislation appears facially to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution). Justice Stone introduced the idea that
prejudice against 'discrete and insular' minorities may be a special condition which curtails the operation of political processes or outcomes in favor of those minorities. I d. at
153 n.4. Justice Stone implied such a condition might warrant a "more searching judicial
inquiry." [d.
71. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Identifying traits are
generally considered physical characteristics which are obvious or distinguishing. See id.
In Frontiero, Justice Brennan found that sex, as an accident of birth, is an immutable
characteristic like race and national origin. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
Race, of course, is considered an immutable characteristic. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (provision of the Public Works Employment Act required that absent administrative waiver, the state or local grantee of federal
funds for public works projects must use at least 10% of the funds to procure services or
supplies from businesses owned by minorities). C{. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442
(retarded persons are immutably different in relevant respects). In City of Cleburne, the
Court also observed that the aging, disabled, mentally ill, and the infirm also have immutable characteristics. [d. at 444-46. Contra Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602 (parents, children, and
siblings do not have characteristics that define them as a group); Castillo, 477 U.S. at
638 (federal food stamp program determined benefit levels by treating parents, children,
and siblings who live together as a single household, but excluded more distant relatives
and groups of unrelated persons from the household; close relatives do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics).
72. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602-03 (citing Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638).
73. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (state appealed a conviction for second degree murder with a sentence for life imprisonment under a statute
allowing appeal in criminal cases; upon reversal and retrial, the accused was convicted of
first degree murder and sentenced to death - fourteenth amendment due process
claim). In Palko, the Court found that the right must be such "that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed." Id. at 326.
74. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a "single family," defined as to exclude
a mother living with her son and two grandsons - fourteenth amendment due process
claim).
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guez,7r' the Court noted that fundamental rights are either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 76 The
Court has found that voting,77 interstate travel,78 access to the
75. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
76. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-35. In Rodriguez, the Court recognized that
education is an important state function. [d. at 29-30. The importance of a service performed by a state does not determine whether it is a fundamental right. [d. at 30. See
also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (statute imposed procedural limitations on
tenants in suits brought by landlords). In Lindsey, the Court observed that the social
importance of a statute is not the critical determinant of whether to subject a statute to
strict scrutiny. See id. at 74. Ct. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right to
individual privacy guaranteed); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (statute
conditioning the right to vote on a one year residency requirement; right to participate in
elections on an equal basis with other citizens protected); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (right of procreation within the right of personal privacy protected by the
Constitution).
77. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Virginia statute making
the right to vote contingent on payment of a poll tax). In Harper, the Court found that
the conditioning of the right to vote on the payment of a poll tax should be closely
scrutinized. [d. at 670. Classifications which might restrain or invade fundamental rights
or liberties must be carefully confined. [d. The right to vote is fundamental to the preservation of all other rights. [d. at 667 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62
(1964) (existing and proposed plans for Alabama legislative apportionment challenged as
violating equal protection guarantees)). The Court found that the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. [d.
Further, the measuring of a voter's qualifications based on his ability to pay a fee is
a capricious and irrelevant factor. [d. at 668. Wealth, like race, creed or color, is irrelevant to the ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. [d. at 668-70. Making suffrage dependent on the voter's affluence or ability to pay is an invidious discriminatory state standard. ld. at 666. The statute was invalidated as the equal protection
clause restrains the states from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate.
ld. Further, once the right to vote is granted, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the equal protection clause. [d. at 665.
See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (New York Education
statute provided that in certain districts residents permitted to vote only if they are
parents, have custody or children enrolled, or they owned or leased taxable real property
within the district). Strict scrutiny was applied as statutes distributing the franchise are
part of the foundation of representative society. [d. at 626. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in selecting public officials
undermines the legitimacy of representative government. [d. Thus, statutes limiting the
right to vote must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a legitimate purpose. See id. at
632. The statute was unconstitutional as it permitted inclusion of persons with remote
interests in school affairs and excluded others with direct interests. [d.
78. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (statute predicating the receipt of
welfare assistance on a one year residency requirement challenged on equal protection
grounds). In Shapiro, the Court observed that the right to interstate travel is a basic
right under our Constitution. [d. at 630-31 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
757 (1966) (defendants indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241 for conspiring to deprive black
citizens of the exercise of constitutional rights, including the right to engage in interstate
travel)). This right is implicit under several sections of the Constitution. [d. at 630 n.8:
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See also Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1871) (state
statute imposed a discriminatory tax on non-resident traders; right to interstate travel
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courts79 are fundamental rights. Some forms of privacy are also
grounded upon the privileges and immunities clause). U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. See also
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (state statute prohibited bringing into
the state any non·resident knowing him or her to be an indigent; privileges and immuni·
ties clause of the fourteenth amendment). U.S. CONST. art. V. See also Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (Secretary of State denied passports to plaintiffs because of
their alleged communist beliefs and refusal to file affidavits regarding past or present
membership in the communist party; due process clause of the fifth amendment).
The nature of our society and our notions of personal liberty require that all citizens
be free to travel interstate without unreasonable restrictions. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 62930. As the classification affected a fundamental right, it is reviewed under strict scrutiny.
See id. at 638. The Court found the statute unconstitutional as the interest in deterring
indigent migration was not a compelling state interest. [d. at 631.
See Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In Blumstein, the Court observed that a classification which serves to penalize the right to travel will be invalidated whether or not it
actually does penalize. [d. at 339-40. See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250 (1974) (Arizona statute required one year of residency in a county as prerequisite for an indigent to receive nonemergency hospitalization or medical care). Whether a
statute is invalidated turns largely on whether a penalty affects a "necessity of life." See
id. at 259. The Court found that medical care is such a necessity of life. See id. at 259-61.
However, states do have a compelling interest in not meddling in matters where
another state has a paramount interest. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (statute
requiring one year of residency before bringing a divorce action against a non-resident).
Further, the state has an interest in divorce consequences which may include provisions
for custody and support. [d. at 406-07. This residency requirement does not irretrievably
foreclose a person from seeking a divorce. [d. The Court concluded those who seek a
divorce may reasonably be required to have some sort of attachment to the state. [d. at
407.
79. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (California required an indigent to
make a preliminary showing of merit before appointing counsel for a direct appeal of
right; indigent criminal defendants appealed denial of appointed counsel to represent
them). In Douglas, the Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause demands equality of access and protection between the rich and poor. See id.
at 357-58. This equality requirement cannot be satisfied where a rich man has a meaningful appeal but the indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, is
only afforded a meaningless ritual. [d. at 358. The Court found that on a first appeal of
right, the right to counsel is fundamental under the equal protection clause. See id. at
356-58. If a state grants such an appeal, it must provide counsel to those defendants who
cannot afford counsel, so they may obtain equal access and properly exercise such rights.
See id. The Court considered prior decisions where it had invalidated laws discriminating against indigent criminal defendants. [d. at 355 (discussing Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent criminal defendant appealed conviction on fourteenth amendment due process grounds as the state denied him a free trial transcript, which was a
prerequisite to obtaining appellate review». Thus, when California denied counsel to the
indigent plaintiff on his only appeal, it invidiously discriminated against him. [d. at 355.
However, access to the judicial process for discretionary state appeals is not considered a fundamental right. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 619 (1974) (North Carolina denied appointment of counsel to convicted indigent on discretionary review). In Ross, the
Court observed that there is no constitutional mandate requiring counsel for discretionary state appeals or for applications to the Supreme Court. [d. at 610,612. The state has
no obligation to provide an appeal. [d. at 611. Therefore, if the state does not provide
counsel for discretionary appeals, there is no violation of the Constitution. See id. Unfairness results only if indigents are denied meaningful access to the appellate system
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protected by the Constitution. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,80 the Court held that a state law prohibiting the use of
contraceptives was unconstitutional as the law violated a fundamental right to marital privacy.81 The Court observed that this
right to marital privacy is fundamental 82 as it is within a general
"zone of privacy" emanating from the first,83 third,84 fourth,8!!
and fifth amendments. 86 The Court has expanded privacy rights
to include the right of persons to obtain contraceptives without
undue restriction 8? and the right of a woman not to be unduly
because of their poverty. [d.
80. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
81. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
82. See id.
83. [d. at 482-83 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 511 (1925) (Oregon statute required that parents and others having control of children send them to
state primary schools; the right to educate one's children as one chooses».
The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I. In Griswold, the Court found a specific marital right to privacy. See
Griswold, 381 U,S. at 485-86. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (1923)
(Nebraska statute prohibited the teaching of any language other than english in public
or private schools; right to study a particular subject or foreign language); DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 363-65 (1937) (Oregon statute prohibited "criminal syndicalism,"
the advocacy of crime or violence as a means of effecting industrial or political change;
right to assembly); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958) (the Alabama attorney general sought memberships lists of all members and agents of the Alabama NAACP
under a statute that required foreign corporations to file a corporate charter with the
secretary of state, designate a place of business and an agent for service of process; right
of freedom of speech and of association).
84. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The third amendment provides: "No Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time
of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.
85. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)
(Customs Act of 1874 authorized the attorney general to order production of relevant
papers belonging to persons accused under the Act; the right of people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects». The fourth amendment provides, in part:
"[t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . . " U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
86. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The fifth amendment provides, in part: "No person
... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... " U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
87. See Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (statute prohibiting
the sale or distribution of any contraceptive except by licensed pharmacists to persons
over sixteen). In Carey, the Court found that the Constitution protects not only use of
contraceptives but more importantly protects individual decisions regarding childbearing
from unjustified state intrusion. [d. The right to privacy requires individual autonomy in
childbearing matters. [d. at 687. Thus, the Court invalidated the statute. [d. at 699.
See Eisenstadt V. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (ban on distributing contraceptives
to unmarried persons for purpose of preventing pregnancy). In Eisenstadt, the Court
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restricted from having an abortion. 88 Finally, the Supreme Court
has determined that education,89 welfare benefits,90 housing and
shelter 91 are not fundamental rights.
observed that if the right to privacy is to be meaningful, it must apply to individuals and
not merely inhere in a marital relationship. [d. at 453. The statute infringed upon an
individual's choice of whether to beget a child and was thus held unconstitutional. See
id. at 443, 453.
Ct. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamsom, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute providing
for the sterilization of habitual criminals). In Skinner, the Court recognized that equal
protection requires that those who commit the same quality of offense must be treated
the same; otherwise, the law invidiously discriminates. [d. at 541. The statute was invalidated as some classes of criminals (for example, those committing grand larceny) were
subject to sterilization, while other classes who engaged in similar offenses (for example,
embezzlers) were not. [d.
The Court also examined the relationship between the asserted right of marriage
and procreation, and the human race. [d. at 541. Laws infringing on the right to procreate require strict scrutiny as marriage and procreation are essential to the survival of the
human race. [d. Sterilization negates this right and can have devastating effects if in the
wrong hands. [d. Thus, the Court noted that the right to marriage and procreation is so
important that remedying the inequality by enlargirig the class of criminals subject to
sterilization might not solve "this particular constitutional difficulty." [d. at 453.
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164-65 (1973) (state statutes prohibiting the
right to an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the mother). In Roe, the
Court noted that the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. [d. at
152. However, the Court found a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy was encompassed within a general right of privacy. See id. at 152-53 (right derived
from the Bill of Rights; the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments; and the concept of
liberty in the fourteenth amendment).
89. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court found that education is not afforded
explicit nor implicit protection under the Constitution. [d. at 35. Education does bear a
close relationship to other rights, such as the effective exercise of first amendment freedoms and the right to vote. [d. However, elevating education to a fundamental right
would exceed the Court's judicial competence and authority. [d. at 31, 36. It is not the
Court's function to guarantee citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed
electoral choices. [d. at 36.
90. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (statute granted welfare benefits to
eligible families based on their 'standard of need' but imposed maximum grant limits of
$250 per month per family regardless of family size or need). In Dandridge, the Court
found that the regulation did not affect any freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
[d. at 484. Thus, the Court found that the receipt of welfare benefits is not a fundamental right. See id. at 484 (plaintiff claimed the regulation violated the fourteenth amendment only because it resulted in some disparity in payments to the largest families). In
the area of social and economic regulation, a state simply had to provide a reasonable
basis for the regulation. [d. at 485. Although the regulation was imperfect, the state did
not violate equal protection simply because of some disparity in the classifications. [d.
91. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 45, 74 (1972). In Lindsey, the Court noted
the importance of safe and sanitary housing. [d. However, the Constitution does not
provide protection or remedies for all social and economic ills. [d. No constitutional
guarantee exists which provides for access to dwellings of a particular quality or a tenant's right to occupy a landlord's real property beyond the lease term without paying
rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the agreement. [d. Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relation-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991

27

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 9

100

2.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:81

Heightened Scrutiny

A classification is constitutional under heightened scrutiny
if it serves important governmental objectives92 and is substantially related to achieving those objectives. 93 Heightened scruships are legislative functions and not fundamental rights. Id.
92. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981) (Military Selective Service
Act requiring the registration of males but not females for possible military service upheld; interest was in developing a pool of potential combat troops). See also Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981) (plurality opinion) (statutory rape law punishing the male, but not female, participant in intercourse when the female was not 18
years of age and not married to the male). In Michael M. the state's interest in preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancies was upheld as a strong state interest. Id.; Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92 (1976) (Oklahoma statutee prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer
to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18). In Craig, the state's
interest was in the enhancement of traffic safety. Id. at 199. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71,76-77 (1971) (statute required the appointment of men over women as estate administrators). In Reed, an early review of a gender classification, the Court found that under
the lesser rationality review, the state's interest in avoiding intra-family controversy and
administrative ease and convenience was an arbitrary legislative choice. Id. at 76. Under
heightened scrutiny, the state was not justified in eliminating a class of contests through
such a gender classification. Id. at 77.
The Court has also reviewed governmental objectives vis-a-vis illegitimacy classifications. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. I, 6 (1983) (state interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent paternity claims); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-100
(1982) (prohibition same as in Pickett, except time period of one year; state interest in
preventing litigation of stale or fraudulent claims); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265, 271
(1978) (plurality opinion) (upholding a state statute which allowed an illegitimate child
to inherit from his intestate father only if a court of competent jurisdiction had, during
the father's life, entered an order declaring paternity; interest in encouraging legitimate
family relationships and maintaining accurate and efficient method of disposing decedent's property); see also Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at
1287 n.14.
93. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 79. In Rostker, the Court observed a high degree of
deference to Congress in military affairs in finding that gender classification was not
invidious. Id. at 65; Michael M., 450 U.S. at 472-73 (statute sufficiently related to California's objective in preventing teenage pregnancy); ct. Craig, 429 U.S. at 200-04 (state
statistics showing that males are substantially more likely to drive under the influence of
alcohol held insufficient to support the conclusion that gender based discrimination
closely serves to achieve the state's objectives).
The Court has also examined illegitimacy classifications. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 271-72,
275-76 (statute substantially related to state's interest in ensuring the accuracy and efficient disposal of an intestate decedent's property as delay and uncertainty are minimized
where the rights of an illegitimate child to notice and participation is a matter of judicial
record before the administration commences; fraudulent assertions of paternity are less
likely to succeed if a paternity suit is brought before a court of law while the decedent is
alive); cf. Pickett, 462 U.S. at 14-15 (no substantial relation between two year limitation
period for bringing paternity claims and state's interest in preventing stale claims as
illegitimate children who were public charges could have paternity and support suits
brought at any time prior to the child's 18th birthday); Mills, 456 U.S. at 101 (no substantial relationship as evidence essential to paternity actions does not disappear within
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tiny is given to illegitimacy94 and gender91i classifications. The
Court affords these classes heightened scrutiny as such characterizations are generally archaic and overbroad. 96
3. Rational Review

All other classifications are given rational basis scrutiny.97
Such classifications are constitutional if the classification IS rationally related 98 to a legitimate state interest. 99
the time period).
94. See, e.g., Pickett, 462 U.S. at 8 (classifications based on legitimacy are subject to
a heightened level of scrutiny); Mills, 456 U.S. at 99 (restrictions must be substantially
related to a legitimate state interest); Cf, Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265 (illegitimacy classification
upheld).
95. See Rostker, 453 U.S: at 69 (heightened scrutiny applied to gender based discrimination); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469, 472-73; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (gender classifications must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives).
The Supreme Court's extension of heightened scrutiny to non-racial classifications
such as gender has been questioned. R. BORK, supra note 59, at 66. Former Judge Bork
has observed the equal protection clause does not forbid virtually all classifications based
on gender as it forbids all classifications that disfavor racial minorities. See id. The ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment did not think racial and sexual groups needed special protection to the same degree. Id.
96. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)
(statute provided for 13 years of commissioned service for female naval officers and only
nine years for males before a mandatory discharge for want of a promotion». The Court
will invalidate a classification where there is a weak relationship between gender and the
characteristic or trait that gender supposedly represents. Id. at 199. Providing gender
classifications heightened review is based on an uncertain rationale. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Sex frequently provides no sensible ground for
differential treatment. Id. Former Justice Brennan would impose strict scrutiny as gender based discrimination is similar to racial discrimination. See id. at 686-88.
See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). In Weinberger, the Court
found that the inconsistent payment of survivor's benefits were pernicious classifications
which deprived women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of
their employment. Id. at 645. The Constitution forbids gender based differentiation
based upon a dependency assumption that when a woman dies her family will require
less protection. Id.
97. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1954) (the
general rule is that legislation is presumed valid).
98. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The state may not rely on classifications
whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. I d. at 446.
Under this standard of review, legislation is usually found rationally related to the
state interest. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 642 (1986) (classification rationally
related to interest in preventing fraud, mistake, and ensuring cost-effectiveness as close
relatives sharing a home tend to purchase and prepare meals together while distant relatives and unrelated individuals might not); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 237-38
(1981) (Congress declined to grant supplemental income benefits to otherwise eligible
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mentally ill patients if they were 21 through 64 years of age and confined in public institutions not receiving Medicaid funds for their care; such allowances were afforded to
inmates of public institutions that received Medicaid funds for their care). In Schweiker,
the Court found that the exclusion was rationally related to Congress's interest in avoiding duplicative spending as Congress can legitimately assume the States would or should
continue to have primary responsibility for providing equivalent funds or basic care. Id.
at 237. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176-78 (1980) (classifications rationally related to interest in the financial integrity of the Railroad Retirement
system as Congress could properly conclude that persons who had actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits while still employed in the industry had a greater
equitable claim to benefits than members of the class who were no longer employed
when they became eligible for dual benefits); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81
(1979) (statute rationally related to preserving the political community as it was carefully framed so as to exclude only those aliens who demonstrated their unwillingness to
obtain United States citizenship; the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, in effect,
chose to classify themselves).
However, legislation has been found irrational under this standard. See City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (the record contained no evidence that the proposed group
home posed any threat to the city's legitimate interest as applied); Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 57, 61 (1982) (Alaska statutory scheme distributed income derived from natural
resources to adult citizens in varying amounts based on the length of each citizen's residence; a scheme granting greater dividends to persons for their residency during the 21
years prior to enactment does not rationally serve the state's legitimate interests); see
also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring,
addressing the equal protection claim which was not a basis for Justice B1ackmun's separate majority opinion) (state statute divided employment discrimination complaints into
two groups accorded disparate treatment: claims processed within 120 days are given full
consideration on the merits whereas identical claims that do not receive a hearing within
120 days are terminated). In Logan, Justice Blackmun observed that terminating potentially meritorious claims does not rationally serve state interests as the length of time it
takes the unemployment commission to process a claim is unrelated to protecting against
frivolous claims. Id. at 439-40.
99. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The Court has observed many legitimate state
interests. See Lyng, 477 U.S. at 640 (preventing fraud, mistake, and ensuring cost-effectiveness); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61 (interests in creating a financial incentive for individuals
to establish and maintain residence in Alaska; encouraging prudent management of the
fund); Logan, 455 U.S. at 439 (eliminating employment discrimination and protecting
against unfounded charges of discrimination); Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 237 (avoiding
spending federal resources on behalf of individuals whose care and treatment are being
fully provided for by state and local government units); Fritz, 449 U.S. at 174 (insuring
the solvency of the railroad retirement system and protecting vested benefits); Norwick,
441 U.S. at 74, 80 (preserving the political community (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 647 (1973»).
But contra City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447 (objective of harming politically unpopular groups is not a legitimate state interest); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61 (interest in apportioning benefits in recognition of undefined contributions which residents have made
during their years of residency).
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In Bowers v. Hardwick/ oo the plaintiff had been charged
with committing sodomylOl with another adult male in the bedroom of his home. lo2 The criminal charge was dropped;lo3 however, the plaintiff challenged the statute as violating his fourteenth amendment due process rights. lo4 The Court found that
the Constitution does not confer a right to privacy that extends
to homosexual conduct;IOIl and that homosexual activity is not a
fundamental right protected by the Federal Constitution. loe
100. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy challenged as applied to homosexuals).
101. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 187-88. Georgia's anti-sodomy statute provided:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs
or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another ....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20
years ....
[d. at 188 n.1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
102. [d. at 188.
103. [d.
104. See id. at 194-96 n.8. See supra notes 72-91 and accompanying text for discussion of fundamental rights. The plaintiff brought suit against the attorney general of
Georgia charging that, as a practicing homosexual, he was in imminent danger of arrest.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188. The plaintiff claimed that homosexual activity was a private
association beyond the reach of state regulation. See id. at 189-91.
105. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190. The Court examined the relationship between the
claimed right and the general right to privacy. See id. at 190-91; see supra notes 80-88
and accompanying text for discussion of the right to privacy. None of the rights explicated in the privacy cases bear any resemblance or relation to the plaintiff's claimed
right. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91. The privacy cases do not stand for the notion that
any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription. [d. at 191.
The Court observed that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause does have
substantive content, subsuming rights not explicitly mentioned in the clause itself. [d. at
191. Such discovered rights are substantially protected from federal or state proscription
or regulation. [d. However, the language of the due process clause appears to focus only
on the processes by which life, liberty or property is taken. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
106. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190. The Court found that the right to engage in
homosexual conduct is neither deeply rooted in our Nation's history nor implicit in our
concept of liberty. [d. at 191-92 (relying on the tests in Palko v. Connecticut and Moore
v. East Cleveland). See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text for discussion of these
tests. The Court explained that proscriptions against homosexual conduct have ancient
roots: until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. See also
Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity,
40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525 (1986) [hereinafter Survey of the Right to Privacy].
Today, 23 states and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties
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Therefore, the Court found that the presumed belief of the
Georgia electorate that homosexuality is immoral was a rational
basis for criminalizing such conduct,107
The federal appellate courts have generally held that gay
plaintiffs are not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class,los
for sodomy performed in private between consenting adults: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3)
(1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122
(Michie 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976);
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (Harrison 1989); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3505 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
14:89, 14:89.1 (West 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1987); MICH. COMPo LAWS
ANN. §§ 750.158, .338, .338 (a)-(b) (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-505 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 201.190 (Michie 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-177 (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612
(1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1978). A Texas trial court recently held that Texas's
sodomy statute was unconstitutional. Morales v. Texas, No. 461-898 (200th J. Dist. Mar.
15, 1991) (per Davis, J.; final judgment granting permanent injunction against enforcement of TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989)). See also London, Gay Groups
Turn to State Courts to Win Rights, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1990, at B6, col. 3.
The Court in Hardwick concluded that plaintiff's claim was, at best, facetious.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194. The Court also declined to take a broad view as to its authority to "discover" new fundamental rights embedded in the due process clause. [d. The
Court observed that there has been a repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that
the Court had placed on the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
[d. at 194-95. The Court warned that "there should be ... great resistance to expand the
substantive reach of those clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental." [d. at 195. Otherwise, the Court "necessarily takes to
itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority."
[d. The Court comes nearest to illegitimacy when it creates constitutional law that has
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. [d. at 194.
107. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196. The Court observed that the law is constantly based
on notions of morality. [d. Majoritarian sentiments about the morality of homosexuality
were an adequate basis for the law. See id.
108. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (Army reserve
sergeant barred from reenlistment as she was an admitted homosexual), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1296 (1990). In Ben-Shalom, the Court found that homosexuals do not constitute
a suspect or quasi-suspect class. [d. See also Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068,
1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff
sought declaratory relief from a Texas statute proscribing "deviate sexual intercourse
with another individual of the same sex"); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397-98
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (27 year old Navy petty officer discharged for engaging in homosexual
conduct with a 19 year old recruit; official Navy policy called for the administrative discharge of any personnel engaging in such conduct). The court in Dronenburg did not
determine whether homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but observed that
the Navy simply had to prove its policy was rationally related to a permissible end. [d.;
cf. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) (Army serviceman
discharged after Army learned that in the enlisting process, serviceman had falsely rep-
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With respect to disabilities suffered by homosexuals, the District
of Columbia Circuit observed that the Supreme Court affords
suspect or quasi-suspect status only when it is "plainly unjustifiable" to discriminate invidiously against a particular class. l09 As
homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right under the due
process clause and can be criminalized,llo state sponsored discrimination against the gay class cannot consistently be considered invidious and unjustifiable. I 11 The court noted that discrimination is rarely more apparent than when conduct which
defines a class is made criminal. 1l2
The circuit courts have generally recognized that homosexuals have suffered from a history of discrimination. 1l3 The Sevresented that he had never engaged in homosexual activities). The court found that a
classification based on choice of sexual partners is not suspect; even if heightened scrutiny were required, the classification was valid because of the Army's compelling interest.
[d.; see infra notes 109-26 and accompanying text for discussion of these cases.
109. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103 (rejected applicant for FBI special agent position challenged refusal to hire her because of her homosexuality). In Padula, the court observed
that the Supreme Court's standard for determining whether a classification is justifiable
is unclear. [d. See supra note 68 for discussion of disabilities suffered by classes seeking
strict or heightened scrutiny.
110. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464; See also Woodward, 871
F.2d at 1076.
111. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103. "It would be quite anomolous [sic] ... to declare
status defined by conduct ... as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause." [d. See also Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (if homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, homosexuals are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class); Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (after Hardwick, it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against gays is constitutionally infirm); compare pre-Hardwick decisions: Baker, 769
F.2d at 292 (strong objection to homosexual conduct prevailing in Western culture for
the past seven centuries); Dronenberg, 741 F.2d at 1391-92 (citing Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Virginia statute criminalizing private consensual homosexual conduct upheld), summarily aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975». In Dronenburg, the Court observed that if a statute proscribing homosexual
conduct in a civilian context is sustainable, then such a regulation is certainly sustainable in a military context. [d. at 1392. .
The invalidation of such classifications by lower courts in the face of contrary Supreme Court precedent might imperil the lower courts' legitimacy as impartial non-political entities. See Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at 1297.
112. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103. See also Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (approving the
rationale of Padula).
113. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 465 (homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination, though perhaps now less in degree); see Padula, 822 F.2d at 104 (homosexuality
generates dislike and disapproval among many); cf. Baker, 769 F.2d at 292 (Western
culture has strongly objected to homosexual conduct for seven centuries). Furthermore,
violence against homosexuals may be increasing. See, e.g., Goleman, Homophobia: Scientists Find Clues to its Roots, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1990, Cl, col. 1 (Science Desk);
Gelman, Bias Crimes Up Slightly This Year, Newsday, May 15, 1990, at 27.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991

33

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 9

106

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:81

enth Circuit found that homosexuals are not politically powerless. ll4 The Federal Circuit found that homosexuality differs
fundamentally from those traits that define currently recognized
suspect and quasi-suspect classes. lllI Homosexuality is primarily
a behavioral trait 1l8 whereas blacks and women exhibit immutable characteristics. ll7
The circuit courts that have reviewed the status of gay classifications have uniformly held that classifications based on sexual preference are reviewed under a rational basis scrutiny.lls A
114. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 466 (homosexuals have proven that they are not without growing political power).
115. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (naval reservist discharged from active duty because of acknowledged homosexuality).
116. [d. In Woodward, the court recognized that suspect classes have immutable
characteristics whereas homosexuality is behavioral in nature. [d. (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (observing that a class is not suspect or quasi-suspect if its
members do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics». See Rich
v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff argued that
homosexuality is an immutable characteristic; the court observed that classifications
based on choice of sexual partners is not suspect); cf. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (FBI
agent's declaration that she was a lesbian can be reasonably viewed as reliable evidence
of a desire and propensity to engage in such conduct; exceptions to such an assumption
will arise, but such an admission is compelling evidence that plaintiff has in the past and
is likely to again engage in such conduct); Padula, 822 F.2d at 102 (plaintiff did not
claim that she did not engage in homosexual conduct; conduct was presumed). In
Padula, the court did not address whether homosexuals who do not engage in homosexual activity are members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. [d.
Some authorities, however, consider homosexuality to be an immutable characteristic or, if not immutable, at least extremely difficult to alter. L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1616 (2d ed. 1988). See Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536
A.2d I, 34 (D.C. 1987) (private Catholic university refused to recognize and financially
support homosexual student organization; there is no scientific agreement as to the origins of sexual orientation although sexual orientation may have multiple roots). In Gay
Rights Coalition, the court observed that it is generally agreed that individual sexual
orientation develops at least by adolescence. [d. (citing A. BELL. SEXUAL PREFERENCE ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN 186-87, 211, 222 (1981». Homosexuality is as
deeply ingrained as heterosexuality. [d. (A. BELL, supra, at 190, 211, 222). There is no
reliable evidence that adult homosexual orientation can be "cured." [d. (A. BELL, supra,
at 217). See also supra note 15.
117. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076. The Court observed that the conduct or behavior
of members of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect class has no relevance to the identification of those groups. [d. See Padula, 822 F.2d at 102 (the immutability of the group's
identifying trait is also to be considered); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ.,
729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (lOth Cir. 1984) (statute provided for the dismissal or suspension of
teachers for engaging in "public homosexual conduct"; classification based on choice of
sexual partners is not suspect as "only four members of the Supreme Court have viewed
gender as a suspect classification"), aff'd, 470 U.S. 903 (l985).
118. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (deferential standard of review held applicable); Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (Navy need not have a compelling interest to justify
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number of legitimate governmental interests have been observed. The Federal Circuit found that the Navy's interest in
maintaining order, morale, discipline, and mutual trust and confidence among service members was legitimate. llB The District of
Columbia Circuit found that the FBI's need to have its agents
able to work in all fifty states 120 and its need to maintain security were also legitimate interests. 121 The Fifth Circuit observed
that the implementing of morality is a permissible state
interest.122
The same courts have given substantial deference to the
parties implementing these classifications in finding a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest. 123 For example, the
discrimination against gay plaintiff); Padula, 822 F.2d at 104 (government laws or practices must, if challenged, pass the rational basis test); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292
(5th Cir. 1985) (standard of review is whether the statute is rationally related to a legiti- .
mate state end); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Navy's
policy must be rationally related to a permissible end); cf. Rich, 735 F.2d at 1229 (declined to determine the level of scrutiny as Army's interest compelling); see also Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at 1287.
119. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076-77 (citing Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398). Other
legitimate interests include insuring the integrity of the system of rank and command;
and recruiting and retaining members of the naval services. [d. The court upheld the
claims court grant of summary judgment to the Navy. [d. See also Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d
465; Rich, 735 F.2d at 1229.
120. Padula, 822 F.2d at 104. The Court noted that the FBI is a national law enforcement agency. [d.
121. [d. FBI agents perform counterintelligence duties that involve highly classified
matters relating to national security. [d.
122. Baker, 769 F.2d at 292.
123. See Padula, 822 F.2d at 101, 104 (FBI policy considered an applicant's sexual
orientation as being relevant to employment; sexual orientation may affect an employee's
susceptibility to compromise or breach of trust). In Padula, the Court found that excluding homosexuals from the FBI was rationally related to protecting security and maintaining a flexible work-force. See id. The criminalization of homosexual conduct paired
with general public disapproval of homosexuality exposes many homosexuals, even
"open" homosexuals, to risks of blackmail; homosexuals may want to protect their partners if not themselves. See id.; ct. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(CIA employee was discharged after he voluntarily admitted to a superior that he was a
homosexual). In Doe, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that an agency (the
CIA) promulgating a regulation would have to justify why such a classification was warranted as being "necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States" - the
standard required under the governing statute. [d. at 1522. The court reversed and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment as the basis for the CIA's discharge was unclear. [d. at 1521.
See also Baker, 769 F.2d at 292. In Baker, the court found that the criminalization
of homosexual conduct was related to the permissible state interest of implementing morality, as Western culture has strongly objected 'to such conduct for the past seven centuries. See id. The Fifth Circuit's en banc opinion reversed the district court's ruling that
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Federal Circuit observed that the military is a unique, specialized society124 and found that the policy of discharging all homosexuals was rationally related to the Navy's interests. 12II Further,
special deference is afforded to the military in matters involving
decisions on morale, discipline, composition and the like. us
IV.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,127 the Ninth Circuit held that gays are not a suspect
or quasi-suspect class; thus the proper standard for reviewing
their equal protection claim was the rational basis standard. 128
The court found that DoD regulations vis-a-vis investigations of
homosexuals were rationally related to permissible ends. 129 The
equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due process clause was not violated. 130
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989) was unconstitutional. Id. at 293.
124. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990).
125. Id. at 1076-77 (relying on the rationale in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388
(D.C. Cir. 1984». In Dronenburg, the court observed that legislation may implement
morality. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398. But it may be argued that naval regulations,
unlike legislative acts, must be rationally related not to morality for its own sake but to a
further end which the Navy is entitled to pursue because of the Navy's assigned function.ld.
The court observed that the effects of homosexual conduct within a naval or military
unit are almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline. Id. Such conduct may
make personal dealings uncomfortable, enhance the possibility of homosexual seduction,
raise questions about the even-handedness of superiors' dealings with lower ranks, and
generate dislike and disapproval among many who find homosexuality morally offensive.
Id. The court observed that the Navy is not required to produce social science data or
results of controlled experiments to prove what common sense and common experience
demonstrate. Id. Requiring discharge for homosexual conduct is a rational means of
achieving the Navy's legitimate interests. Id.
126. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1077 (noting that a court should not substitute its view
for the professional judgment of the Armed Forces).
127. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th
Cir.), reh'g en bane denied, 909 F.2d 375 (1990). The Ninth Circuit reviewed denovo the
district court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Id. at 570. See High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Denovo is defined: anew; afresh; a second time. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (5th ed.
1981).
128. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571.
129. Id. at 576.
130. Id. at 575-76. The court observed the general rule that "legislation ... will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
[governmental] interest." Id. at 575 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985».
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The court first acknowledged that the plaintiffs were entitled to equal protection under the "equal protection component"
of the fifth amendment's due process clause. l3l However, the
court observed that under Bowers u. Hardwick, the fifth amendment's due process clause does not afford homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in homosexual conduct. 132 Therefore, the
court determined that it would be incongruous to find a fundamental right of homosexual conduct under equal protection
analysis,133 as equal protection guarantees provided by the fifth
amendment are simply a component of the fifth amendment's
due process clause. 134 Accordingly, the court found that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to heightened scrutiny under the
"impingement of a fundamental right" prong of equal protection
claims. 13G
The court proceeded to review whether homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, which would require appli131. [d. at 570. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the plaintiffs' claim as if the court was
analyzing a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim. [d. at 570-71.
132. [d. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1986». Specifically, homosexual sodomy can be criminalized without violating due process. [d. (citing Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194-96).
133. [d. at 571. The court noted Hardwick's admonition that there should be great
resistance to expanding the substantive reach of the due process clause. [d. See supra
note 106.
The Ninth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court has never held homosexuality
to a heightened standard of review. [d. at 572. However, prior decisions of the Ninth
Circuit had so held. [d. at 572-73 (citing Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376,
1378 (9th Cir.) (gay Army lieutenant convicted of sodomy by a general court-martial
under Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864
(1981) and Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (Navy regulations prohibited Navy personnel from engaging in homosexual acts; following administrative discharge and review by the Secretary of the Navy for admitting to homosexual acts, enlisted personnel challenged constitutionality of regulations and proceedings». In
Hatheway, the court applied heightened scrutiny review as the "classification penalize[dl
the exercise of a fundamental right." Hatheway, 641 F.2d at 1382, 1382 n.6. The court in
Hatheway did not reach the question of whether homosexuals were a suspect or quasisuspect class. Id. In Beller, the court found that, under a substantive due process claim,
the classification should be reviewed under a standard somewhere between the rational
relation and strict scrutiny standards. Beller, 632 F.2d at 807-09.
These pre-Hardwick decisions were based on Supreme Court precedent which, at
the time, suggested that some forms of government regulation of private consensual homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge. High Tech Gays, 895
F.2d at 572 n.7 (citing Beller, 632 F.2d at 810). These prior decisions were overruled by
Hardwick. Id. at 572. Therefore, neither Beller nor Hatheway is binding authority regarding heightened scrutiny for classifications based on homosexuality. [d.
134. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d. at 571.
135. [d.
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cation of a heightened level of scrutiny.IS8 Initially, the court observed that homosexuals cannot be accorded suspect or quasisuspect status as homosexual conduct can be criminalized. 137
Further relying, in part, on the test for suspectness articulated
in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,188 the court found
that homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination. 139
However, homosexuals have political clout as state legislation
has addressed discrimination against homosexuals. 1'0
The court also observed that homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic but is behavioral. lU Therefore, homosexuality is fundamentally different from the traits associated with
race, gender, or alienage,,'2 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that
homosexuals do not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class H3
and regulations which discriminate against gays are reviewed using rational basis scrutiny. I"
Applying rational review, the court found that ensuring national security was a permissible goal for the DoD.HlI Further,
the DoD's investigatory pOlicyU8 and resulting procedures vis-a136. [d. at 571·74.
137. [d. at 571.
138. [d. at 573 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard. 483 U.S. 587, 602·03 (1987) (the "saddled
with disabilities" test was not addressed»; See supra notes 65· 71 and accompanying text
for discussion of Rodriguez.
139. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573.
140. [d. at 574 n.10 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31·395 (West 1988) (barring em·
ployment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West
1984) (barring violence against persons or property based on sexual orientation); MICH.
COMPo LAWS ANN. § 333.20201(2)(a) (West 1984) (barring denial of care in health facilities on the basis of sexual orientation».
141. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573.
142. [d. The behavior of already recognized suspect or quasi·suspect classes is irrelevant to their identification. [d. at 573·74.
143. [d. at 571, 574.
144. [d. at 570·71.
145. See id. at 578 (citing Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988)
(employee was removed for cause from a submarine facility after the Navy denied him a
required security clearance; on appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Board,
in reversing the Navy's decision, found that it had authority to review the merits of the
underlying security clearance determination and that the Navy had failed to show its
determination was reasonable». In Egan, the Court found that both the DoD and agency
heads have a legitimate interest in national security and in protecting classified information. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528·29.
146. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576·77. The court observed that the DoD's policy
was essentially as follows: The head of a government agency who must bear the responsi·
bility for protecting classified information in his custody should have the final say in
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vis homosexuals 147 were rationally related to this end. The DoD
proffered sufficient evidence u8 that hostile intelligence services
target homosexuals to obtain classified information. U9 The
deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access to such information.
[d. at 578 (citing Egan, 484 U.S. at 529). Consequently, those with sufficient expertise

must try and predict who is vulnerable to counterintelligence efforts. See id. at 577. The
court found that in predicting who is vulnerable to foreign intelligence activities, it is
rational to try and determine what groups will be targeted. See id. Once it is determined
who is targeted, applications for security clearances are designed to elicit the information
necessary for determining if the applicant has characteristics of the targeted groups. See
id. Expanded investigations of applicants falling within a targeted group help determine
whether they are susceptible to coercion or vulnerable to hostile intelligence efforts. [d.
The counterintelligence service's reasons for targeting the group, even if based on contino
uing ignorance or prejudice, are irrelevant. [d. at 578.
The court recognized that attempting to define an individual's future actions and
the actions of outside and unknown influences is an inexact science at best. [d. at 577-78.
A court must afford special deference to the executive branch when adjudicating matters
involving their decisions on protecting classified information. Id. at 576.
The DoD's other justifications for its policies, that homosexuals may be emotionally
unstable and that homosexual conduct may be criminal, were not addressed. [d. at 578
n.13. The Ninth Circuit deemed it unnecessary to do so as the targeting of homosexuals
by foreign intelligence agencies is sufficient justification for the expanded investigations.
[d.
147. See supra notes 38·41 and accompanying text for the DoD's policies relating to
homosexual applicants. As discussed supra note 146, expanded investigations help determine if the applicant is susceptible to coercion, blackmail, or vulnerable to counterintelligence efforts. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576.
148. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576 (discussing the cross-motions for summary
judgment). The cotirt found that the DoD had met its burden of persuasion. [d.
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (nonprofit corporation, a "citizens' lobby," alleged that certain
statements in petitioner's magazine were false and derogatory). Once the moving party
satisfies this burden, the opponent must marshal specific facts showing that a genuine
issue for trial remains. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
If the nonmoving party has the burden of persuasion at trial, the party moving for
summary judgment may satisfy its burden of production under Rule 56 by submitting
affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or by
demonstrating to the court that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (wrongful death action alleged to have resulted from exposure to
asbestos products manufactured by defendants).
In a review of a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views the materials
on file in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ashton v. Cory, 780 F.2d 816,
818 (9th Cir. 1986) (California Franchise Tax Board served withholding notices on an
Employee Welfare Benefit Plan in an attempt to collect delinquent personal income
taxes of fund participants; the Plan sought declaratory judgment prohibiting the service
of these notices as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempted the
statute under which the Franchise Tax Board served the notices).
149. High'Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576-77. See supra note 15 enumerating the DoD's
proffered evidence demonstrating that homosexuals are targeted by hostile intelligence
agencies.
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plaintiffs failed to show that the DoD did not have a rational
basis for its expanded security investigations of homosexuals. 1110
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order
granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs and remanded to
the district court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the
DoD.m
V.

CRITIQUE

In High Tech Gays,t1l2 the Ninth Circuit found that homosexual conduct was not a fundamental right under the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment's due process
clause,1113 which was consistent with Supreme Court precedent
established in Bowers u. Hardwick. In the instant case, the
Ninth Circuit properly explained that it is not possible to infer
that the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's
150. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575. The Ninth Circuit observed that plaintiffs'
proffered evidence did not raise genuine issues as to any fact material to the alleged
constitutional violation but merely raise an issue as to the alleged irrationality of the
KGB's opinion regarding homosexual behavior. [d. at 578. The plaintiffs evidence did
not adequately address whether homosexuals, in fact, are targeted by counterintelligence
agencies. [d.; see supra note 15 enumerating plai\ltiffs proffered evidence demonstrating
that the DoD's policies are irrational. For example, the Senate subcommittee hearings
cited by the plaintiffs involved a limited number of cases and was not a study of all
significant cases involving homosexuals. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575. Further, one
of the cases pointed out that homosexuals are targeted by the KGB. [d. The court dismissed the depositions of Richard Olinger because of the li~ited agenda of the confer·
ences he attended. [d. at 575-76.
The court dismissed the plaintiffs first amendment claim as the plaintiffs did not
allege that any gay person had been denied a security clearance or had been subjected to
an expanded investigation based solely, as a distinct abstract ground, on membership in
a gay organization. [d. at 580.
151. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 581.
152. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th
Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 909 F.2d 375 (1990).
153. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571. See supra note 110-11 and accompanying
text for appellate decisions agreeing that homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right.
The Ninth Circuit appeared to heed the Supreme Court's warning in Hardwick: that
court's are most vulnerable and come nearest to illegitimacy when they deal with judgemade constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution, especially where they redefine the category of rights deemed to be fun·
damental. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). See also Woodward v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990). The
court in Woodward observed that "[ilf it is in any degree doubtful that the Supreme
Court should freely create new constitutional rights, ... it is certain that lower courts
should not do so." [d. at 1075 (emphasis added) (citing Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d
1388, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supra notes 108-26 and accompanying text for discus·
sion of appellate court decisions.
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due process clause could independently protect homosexual activity when the same due process clause itself does not recognize
homosexuality as a fundamental right. 11I4
The Ninth Circuit aligned itself with other circuits in finding that gays do not constitute a suspect or quasi-s~spect
class. 11I1I The court recognized the contradiction that would arise
were a heightened class status granted: a state could constitutionally criminalize homosexual sodomy l1l6 while state courts adjudicating equal protection claims would be compelled to invalidate such classifications. 1117 The possibility of such an
implausible contradiction was sufficient to deny heightened
scrutiny to homosexuals.
Through application of the Rodriguez tests,11I8 the Ninth
Circuit determined that it would have denied heightened scrutiny irrespective of Hardwick. The court conceded that homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination,11I9 but relied in
part on gay's political clout in denying them heightened scru154. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text; notes 100-07 and accompanying text for discussion of Bowers v. Hardwick. This finding was also consistent with and
explained the post-Hardwick decisions by other circuits. See supra notes 109-12 and
accompanying text. Other circuits have simply noted that as homosexual conduct can be
criminalized, homosexuals cannot be afforded heightened scrutiny. [d.
The Ninth Circuit appeared to reject the district court's holding that some forms of
homosexual conduct are protected as fundamental rights under the general right of privacy. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text for discussion' of Bowers v.
Hardwick.
157. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text for background discussion of
this recognized incongruity.
158. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text; notes 138-41 and accompanying
text for the Ninth Circuit's application of Rodriguez.
159. See supra note 138-39 and accompanying text. This finding was consistent with
findings of other courts that have dealt with the issue. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Such a proposition hardly needs further discussion except to make a few brief
observations: The courts and the legislatures generally do not look favorably upon gay
interests. See Survey of the Right to Privacy, supra note 106, at 524. See, e.g., National
Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984) (state statute providing for the dismissal or suspension of teachers for engaging in public homosexual conduct
upheld), aff'd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
Further, as of this writing, private consensual sodomy is still a criminal offense in 23
states and the District of Columbia. See supra note 106 for states still outlawing consensual adult sodomy. Finally, violence against gays appears to be increasing. See supra
note 113.
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tiny.160 However, women have been afforded heightened status
despite the fact that they have more political power than gays.161
This suggests that, at least in the context of homosexual classifications, there is no correlation between lack of political power
and whether a class is afforded heightened scrutiny.162
Further, the Ninth Circuit's broad observation that homosexuality is behavioral and not immutable is questionable. 163
While consistent with circuits that have considered the issue,164
this observation is contrary to medical and psychological research which suggests that sexual preference may be established
at an early age. 161! As some homosexuals may be born gay or develop their sexual orientation during their formative years, the
court made too broad a conclusion in declaring that homosexual160. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. The court recognized that political
powerlessness is a characteristic of prior classes who had been granted heightened scrutiny.ld.
161. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting) (homosexuals are regarded by the national parties as
"political pariahs") denying reh'g to 895 F.2d 563. Judge Canby observed that "[olne can
easily find examples of major political parties openly tailoring their position to appeal to
black voters, and to female voters. One cannot find comparable examples of appeals to
homosexual voters." Id.
162. Further, the general problem with this part of the Rodriguez test is that it is
malleable; any court could likely point to a group as having political power and thus
disqualify them from suspect class status. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1954) (majority found that retarded people were not politically powerless) (Brennan, J., observed that the only discrimination the Court would
remedy is the discrimination they alone were "perspicacious enough to see").
163. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
164. See .~upra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. Whether the disposition to homosexuality is an acquired behavioral trait or an inborn (and in a sense, an immutable
characteristic), the appellate courts' general approach has been to focus on the outward
behavioral manifestations of homosexual orientation regardless of, what may be termed,
the "cause" of homosexuality. Id.
As the court observed in Ben-Shalom, the classifications do not classify based
merely upon status as a homosexual, but upon a reasonable inference about probable
conduct in the past and future. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990). The government does not have to ignore the practical
reality of the situation, nor be required to police soldiers' personal relationships for evidence of homosexual conduct in order to enforce its regulations. See id.
The Ninth Circuit did not directly address the district court's conclusion that the
statute impinged upon homosexual orientation. See supra note 18. Perhaps the court did
not address the scope of the classification as the 000 policy was rational regardless of
whether the classification affected homosexual orientation. However, the court's observation that homosexuality is behavioral indicates a likely rejection of the district court's
finding; the classifications simply did not impinge upon what may be termed "homosexual orientation." See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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ity is behavioral and not immutable.
It appears that gays, or at least some classes of gays, would
substantially satisfy the requirements for heightened class status
if the court were required to rely solely on the Rodriguez tests.
Nonetheless, the court did arrive at the proper finding vis-a-vis
class status: the Rodriguez tests appear to be irrelevant where
the Supreme Court has held that states can engage in the ultimate discrimination - criminalizing the particular conduct that
defines the class. As a state can criminalize homosexual conduct
without violating the due process clause, it is but an intellectual
exercise in the review of similar classifications to determine
whether homosexuality is an innate characteristic or whether
homosexuals have political power. 166 Irrespective of the proper
answer to these issues, the Supreme Court has found that such
discrimination is constitutional,l67 In the instant case, the alleged discrimination was considerably less severe than criminalizing homosexual conduct. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should
have recognized that Rodriguez was inapplicable in reaching its
decision to deny heightened scrutiny to homosexuals.

The Ninth Circuit's brief recognition of the DoD's interest
166. The post-Bowers federal appellate court opinions may have implicitly recognized this proposition. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (if
homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals are not entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (agreeing with the rationale
in Padula v. Webster), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (if the Supreme Court is unwilling to invalidate laws that
criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is not an option for a lower court to
conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious). However,
these decisions also applied various parts of the Rodriguez tests. See supra notes 114-17.
Alternatively, High Tech Gays and the other federal appellate court decisions could
signify a general decline in the utility of the Rodriguez tests. With respect to homosexual
classifications, it is unclear how much weight the courts ultimately afford application of
the Rodriguez tests.
167. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bowers v.
Hardwick. While the Court in Hardwick did not address the issue of why gays engage in
such conduct, the Court impliedly found that it does not matter as long as a state has a
rational basis for the law. The presumed beliefs of the majority of the Georgia electorate
that homosexuality is immoral was sufficient. Had the Court thought immutability important, it likely would have addressed the issue as anti-sodomy statutes do not make
exceptions for those immutably disposed to homosexuality.
Likewise, the amount of political power that gays have was also irrelevant to the
Court's holdings in Hardwick. Therefore, the question of whether homosexuals have political clout is only important to the extent gays can assert their interests in the state,
local and federal legislatures.
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in national security as compelling is consistent with other circuits. lsS Finding that being the rationale for the classification
was sound is consistent with the outcomes in other circuits, a
seeming fait accompli ls9 although some courts have warned
against thinking SO.170
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit placed itself in accord with other circuits
with respect to the class status of homosexuals for equal protection purposes. The rationality standard is appropriate as there is
no constitutional basis for affording heightened scrutiny. Gays
will have to rely upon the legislature to advance their interests
as classifications affecting them will usually withstand the rational review standard as evidenced by this ruling.
Having decided that the lowest standard is constitutionally
required, there remains the question as to the overall merit of
the national security policy.l7l As the Ninth Circuit recognized
in Beller v. Middendorf:
Upholding the challenged regulations as constitutional is distinct from a statement that they are
168. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. It is beyond question that the government has a substantial interest in national security.
169. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text. As the plaintiffs failed to prove
homosexuals were not targeted, their only alternative was to prove the articulated policy
erroneous. They had to show that the DoD's policy was not rationally related to its interests or that there was some fallacy in the DoD's justification. See High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 576 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the
DoD's two-step analysis).
For example, the court implied that the DoD, in predicting who is vulnerable to
foreign intelligence activities, rationally tries to determine who is targeted. Id. at 577.
Any plaintiff challenging DoD classifications would have difficulty rebutting the contention that it is rational to try and determine who is targeted. The consequences of such a
rebuttal would likely mean that the government could not use any information received
regarding groups targeted by such foreign agencies.
As the activity of intelligence networks in east-block countries declines, the DoD's
rationale for expanded investigations may decline in validity or importance; however,
intelligence activities by foreign intelligence services may be expanding. See, e.g., CIA
Chief Says Soviet Spying is on Rise, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 30, 1989, at 6, pt. A.
170. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (simply because homosexual conduct can be criminalized does not mean that any negative state
action is constitutionally authorized; laws or government practices must be justified in
terms of some government purpose).
171. See supra notes 35-41 for discussion of the I;>oD's investigatory policy vis-a-vis
homosexuals.
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wise. The latter judgment is neither implicit m
our decision nor within our province to
make . . . . 172

Thomas A. Johnson*

172. 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, J.) (See supra note 133). An analysis of whether the regulations in question strike the proper balance between the need to
protect national security and the need to prevent unwarranted infringements on individual liberties is beyond the scope of this Note.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
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